Minority Dissent and Social Acceptance in Collaborative Learning Groups by Petru L. Curşeu et al.
fpsyg-08-00458 March 25, 2017 Time: 12:55 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 28 March 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00458
Edited by:
Michael S. Dempsey,
Boston University, USA
Reviewed by:
E. Michael Nussbaum,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA
Kevin L. Blankenship,
Iowa State University, USA
*Correspondence:
Petru L. Curs¸eu
petrucurseu@psychology.ro
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Educational Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 19 December 2016
Accepted: 13 March 2017
Published: 28 March 2017
Citation:
Curs¸eu PL, Schruijer SGL and
Fodor OC (2017) Minority Dissent
and Social Acceptance
in Collaborative Learning Groups.
Front. Psychol. 8:458.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00458
Minority Dissent and Social
Acceptance in Collaborative
Learning Groups
Petru L. Curs¸eu1,2*, Sandra G. L. Schruijer3,4 and Oana C. Fodor1
1 Department of Psychology, “Babes-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 2 Department of Organisation, Open
University of the Netherlands, Heerlen, Netherlands, 3 Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht,
Netherlands, 4 Tias School for Business and Society, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
The main aim of this paper is to test the extent to which social acceptance moderates
the impact of minority dissent on group cognitive complexity (GCC). We hypothesize
that divergent views expressed by a minority increase GCC especially when the group
climate is open to divergent contributions (e.g., a socially accepting group climate).
We also hypothesize that group size has a non-linear association with GCC in such
a way that GCC increases as group size increases from low to average and then
GCC decreases as group size further increases from average to high. We test these
hypotheses in a sample of 537 students (258 women, with an average age of 23.35)
organized in 92 groups that have worked together in the same group throughout the
semester, and show that: (1) group size has a decreasing positive association with GCC,
(2) both minority dissent and social acceptance are beneficial for GCC and (3) groups
with the highest GCC are those that experience minority dissent and develop a socially
accepting climate (in which group members can equally participate to the task), allowing
the majority to process the dissenting views extensively.
Keywords: group cognitive complexity, collaborative learning, minority dissent, social acceptance
INTRODUCTION
Groups are extensively used in higher education in order to promote the transfer and acquisition
of curricular knowledge (Lou et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2004; Curs¸eu and Pluut, 2013; Kamau and
Spong, 2015; de Hei et al., 2016). In collaborative learning, student groups engage collectively
in educational activities in order to develop shared curricular knowledge (Lou et al., 2001;
Van den Bossche et al., 2006; Nussbaum, 2008; Hämäläinen and Vähäsantanen, 2011). Beyond
cognitive benefits derived from peer influences, collaborative learning groups also generate
cognitive structures that surpass a simple aggregation of individual cognitions (Curs¸eu et al.,
2007; Curs¸eu and Pluut, 2013). In other words, when students engage with curricular knowledge
through working in groups, they can develop a collective understanding of the study material
that transcends individual knowledge and comprehension. Group cognitive complexity (GCC)
refers to the richness of these collective knowledge structures that is generated by the interplay
of individual cognitive structures during interpersonal and intragroup interactions (Gruenfeld and
Hollingshead, 1993; Curs¸eu et al., 2007).
Research to date has explored various antecedents of GCC ranging from individual cognitive
complexity (Curs¸eu et al., 2007) to group diversity (Curs¸eu and Pluut, 2013) with the observation
that the quality of interpersonal and intragroup interactions in collaborative learning groups
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is key in allowing integration of individual knowledge into
collective emergent knowledge structures. The emergence of
complex cognitive structures at the group level requires
both cognitive differentiation and integration (Gruenfeld and
Hollingshead, 1993). Through dialogue and argumentation,
group members develop a better understanding of the curricular
knowledge (Nussbaum, 2008; Nussbaum and Edwards, 2011).
That is, group members have to engage in debates and task-
related disagreements in order to generate the requisite variety
for complex collective structures, yet they also need to converge
in order for the collective structure to reach stability (Nussbaum
and Schraw, 2007; Curs¸eu et al., 2012a).
Active minorities (group members that express views that
differ from those held by the majority) have been shown to
generate cognitive differentiation both for individual group
members (Moscovici, 1980) as well as for the group as a whole
(Nemeth, 1985, 1986; De Dreu and West, 2001). Minority
dissent, however, is associated with relationship conflict and
social rejection (Curs¸eu et al., 2012b) as dissenters often threaten
the social harmony of the group. An open and accepting group
climate could, however, generate the integrative potential needed
for the effective integration of diverse points of view and
thus render minority dissent effective in generating cognitive
complexity. The aim of this paper is to test the interplay between
minority dissent and social acceptance as antecedents of GCC.
Minority Dissent and GCC
In general terms, dissent describes “the expression of
disagreement with group norms, group action or a group
decision” (Jetten and Hornsey, 2014, p. 463) and in particular,
minority dissent describes situations in which one group
member or a minority faction in a group expresses views that
contradict the ones expressed by the majority of the group
(Nemeth, 1986, 2012; Curs¸eu et al., 2012b). Moscovici’s minority
dissent experiments showed that active minorities trigger
cognitive conflict in the minds of the remaining group members
and have the potential to lead to important (individual level)
cognitive changes (Moscovici et al., 1969). Building on these
insights on minority influence (Moscovici, 1976), subsequent
research showed that minority dissent has important group level
consequences as well (Nemeth, 1986; De Dreu and West, 2001;
Curs¸eu et al., 2012b). In particular, minority dissent fosters group
creativity and decision quality (Nemeth, 1985, 1986, 2012),
innovation (De Dreu and West, 2001) and stimulates knowledge
elaboration in groups (Curs¸eu et al., 2012b). In her extensive
work on minority influence, Nemeth argues that minority dissent
stimulates reflective processes in groups and divergent thought,
which in turn are reflected in better information processing.
A more recent paper (Curs¸eu et al., 2012b) supports these claims
and shows that indeed minority dissent has a positive influence
on GCC. Minority dissent is conducive for innovation and
creativity in groups (Nemeth, 1985; De Dreu and West, 2001)
and it increases the depth of information processing (Van Dyne
and Saavedra, 1996; Nussbaum, 2008; Nussbaum and Edwards,
2011) and decision quality in groups (Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006).
In line with the positive influence of minority dissent on the
depth of information processing in groups we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Minority dissent has a positive influence on group
cognitive complexity.
Social Acceptance and GCC
Building on a social exchange perspective, the idiosyncrasy
credits (IC) model (Hollander, 1958) argues that the group
awards “interpersonal credits” to its individual members for
behaviors that are aligned with normative expectations. In
other words, socially desirable behaviors that preserve the social
harmony within the group increase one’s interpersonal credit,
while dissent as a disruptive interpersonal behavior is taxing on
one’s interpersonal credit in the group. A group member can be
influential only to the extent to which its interpersonal IC does
not run out (IC > 0). A corollary of the IC model (Hollander,
1958) for minority influence is that cognitive change induced
by minority dissent is most effective when the dissenter first
conforms to the group (accumulates interpersonal credit) and
only then engages in dissent. Bray et al. (1982) tested this claim
against Moscovici’s approach to minority influence (Moscovici,
1980) and showed that indeed minority dissent was most effective
when it followed initial conformity with majority opinions.
According to Hollander (1958) an accepting group climate is an
important factor for the acquisition of IC. Members in groups
that display an accepting climate have a higher IC and thus more
legitimacy in engaging in dissent as compared to members of
groups in which social acceptance is low. As a consequence we
expect that an accepting group climate increases the interpersonal
IC of its members and, as such, minority dissent (MD) will be
more effective than in groups that lack an accepting climate.
As argued, overt dissent often threatens the social harmony
in groups and minority dissent triggers social rejection and
relationship conflict (Curs¸eu et al., 2012b). In other words,
dissent seems to have both positive and detrimental influences
on information processing in groups. On the one hand, then,
minority dissent is beneficial for the emergence of group
cognition because it stimulates the depth of information
processing (reflective and divergent thought processes) and,
on the other hand, is detrimental for group atmosphere as
it generates a negative affective climate (social rejection and
relationship conflict). The dissenter leaving the group has
(ironically) positive effects on GCC due to the diffusion of
threat associated with minority dissent (Curs¸eu et al., 2012b). In
other words, groups that can mitigate the threat associated with
minority dissent seem to reap the cognitive benefits of minority
dissent.
Previous research regarding the emergence of GCC shows
that unequal participation is detrimental for GCC (Curs¸eu et al.,
2010b) and the quality of interpersonal interactions has a positive
effect on GCC (Curs¸eu et al., 2010a). In other words, GCC
needs both cognitive differentiation (minority dissent, diversity
of points of view) as well as social integration (high quality
interpersonal interactions, good teamwork quality). In line with
these arguments we argue that if the dissenter is accepted and
the dissenting behavior is perceived by the group members as
being helpful, the cognitive benefits of dissent can be enhanced.
The divergent views expressed by a minority are most likely
to increase GCC when the group climate is open to divergent
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contributions (e.g., a socially accepting group climate). We
therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: Social acceptance increases the positive
association between minority dissent and GCC.
Group Size, Minority Dissent, and GCC
In collaborative learning research, group size is one of the most
common control variables as it can influence a variety of group
(learning) processes and outcomes. On the one hand, group size
is expected to be beneficial for group learning effectiveness as
it is indicative of the knowledge pool and expertise members
bring to the group, with larger groups benefiting from a
more consistent knowledge base and expertise (Horowitz and
Bordens, 2002) as well as from better error detection and
correction (Hinsz, 2015). On the other hand, group size has a
negative association with group learning effectiveness as larger
groups tend to experience more process losses (social loafing,
social inhibitions, diffusion of responsibility, Latané and Nida,
1981), more affective conflict (Amason and Sapienza, 1997)
and less social support and more relational losses (Mueller,
2012).
Previous research on GCC reports very small correlations
between group size and GCC (r = 0.08 in Curs¸eu et al.,
2010b; r = −0.02 in Curs¸eu and Pluut, 2013, r = −0.06
in McNamara et al., 2002). These results are in line with
meta-analytic evidence showing that group size has no
linear association with collaborative learning effectiveness
in groups (ρ = −0.02, see Tomcho and Foels, 2012). It
is plausible that these small correlations can be explained by
an underlying non-linear association between group size and
GCC. This non-linear association reflects the co-existence
of two mechanisms (one cognitive and one social-relational)
that explain the association between the group size and
GCC. The cognitive mechanism refers to the diversified,
non-redundant knowledge that is entered in group debates
by each additional group member and it explains the positive
association between group size and GCC. The socio-relational
mechanisms refer to coordination costs, social loafing, decrease
of helping behaviors and social support as group size increases
and it explains the negative association between group size
and GCC.
The co-existence of these two mechanisms is also supported
by meta-analytic evidence (Lou et al., 1996) showing that
collaborative learning is effective in dyads (d = 0.15) or in
groups of 3–4 (d = 0.22), and it is not effective when the
group size varies between five and seven members (d = −0.02).
The cognitive mechanism is supported by another meta-analysis
that integrated the results of studies that compared knowledge
transfer in individual learning compared with learning in a dyad
or triad that reported a positive effect of collaborative learning
on knowledge transfer in these small group settings (Pai et al.,
2015).
Previous research (Hoegl, 2006; Mueller, 2012) already
suggested that depending on the group task, an optimal group
size could be identified in relation to collective performance.
We therefore use a benefits-costs framework to argue that the
initial cognitive benefits experienced as group size increases from
3 to 5 or 6 members are overcompensated for by the relational
hindrances when the group size further increases to seven or eight
members. We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: Group size has a non-linear association with
GCC, in such a way that for low to average group size, the
relationship between group size and GCC is positive, while for
average to high group sizes, the positive relationship diminishes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample and Procedure
Five hundred and thirty seven students (256 women,
MAGE = 23.35), organized in 92 groups, each having 3–8
members participated in the study. All students were enrolled in
a Dutch university and were engaged in collaborative learning as
part of their curricular activities. During the semester, the groups
had to solve case studies and perform different group exercises.
As part of the course evaluation, each group was asked at the end
of the semester to generate a cognitive map that captured their
group understanding of the conceptual domain of the course
(the course included topics like organizational diversity, conflict,
team design and effectiveness, virtual organizations, multi-team
systems). Each group was then asked to rate its cognitive map
by comparing it to a map generated by two experts in the field.
The self-rated grade covered 15% of the final course grade. After
the cognitive mapping session at the end of the course, group
members were asked to fill out a questionnaire and evaluate
their way of working together during the cognitive mapping
session.
Ethics Statement
The data collection for the current study started in 2010 and
according to the Dutch national ethical guidelines at the onset
of the project, studies based on questionnaires that do not
require any personal data with the potential to embarrass the
participants were exempt from ethical committee approval. As
the study was carried out as part of course related activities and
no foreseeable risks beyond those present in regular curricular
activities were anticipated, we did not ask for further approval
from the local IRB.
Measures
Social acceptance was evaluated with three items (“My ideas
were fully accepted by the other team members,” “My team
members appreciated my contributions to the group debates,”
“I was treated as a marginal person by the other team members
and my contributions were often disregarded” – reversed coded).
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.758. Because the group level
scores will be used for further analyses, we used the aggregation
statistics to support the aggregation of individual scores to the
group level. Within-group agreement index (Rwg, James et al.,
1993) and the intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs, Bliese and
Halverson, 1998) are two of the most frequently used aggregation
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statistics in small group research (Woehr et al., 2015). The within-
group agreement index is based on the within-group standard
deviation of the individual scores while for computing the ICCs
we used Bliese and Halverson’s (1998) formulas, based on the one
way random effects analysis of variance:
ICC(1) = MSb −MSw
MSb + ((Ng − 1)× MSw) ,
where: MSb is mean square between subjects, MSw is mean square
within subjects and Ng is the arithmetic mean of group sizes.
Values of the ICC(1) refer to the amount of variance in a variable
that can be attributed to the group and also reflects the extent to
which individual scores within groups can be used to estimate
the aggregated variable (Woehr et al., 2015). The ICC(2) is an
indicator of group-mean reliability and it is computed based on
the ICC(1) values using the following formula:
ICC(2) = Ng × (ICC(1))
1+ (Ng − 1)× ICC(1) .
For our sample, the within-group agreement index ranges from
0.70 to 1.00 with an average of 0.91. The ICC(1) is 0.23 and
ICC(2) is 0.63. In line with the guidelines presented in Woehr
et al. (2015), based on these values of the aggregation statistics,
we can conclude that the individual scores can be aggregated at
the group level.
Minority dissent was evaluated with four items presented
in Curs¸eu and ten Brink (2016) (e.g., “One or two team
members often expressed ideas completely different than those
of the other team members”). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale
is 0.848. Although the individual group members are the unit
of observation, minority dissent reflects the groups as entities.
Therefore, before aggregating the individual scores to the group
level, we computed several aggregation statistics. The within-
group agreement index ranges from 0.74 to 1.00, with a mean
of 0.91. The ICC(1) is 0.36 and the ICC(2) is 0.77. Therefore,
aggregation at the group level is appropriate.
Group cognitive complexity was evaluated using a group
cognitive mapping procedure described in Curs¸eu et al. (2007).
Groups were given twenty key concepts extracted from the
course material and were asked to organize these concepts
on an A3 page in a way that reflected their collective
understanding of the concepts and their relationships. After
arranging the concepts, the students were instructed to draw
and label the connections between them. Three cognitive
map indicators were evaluated by an external rater, namely,
map connectivity (the number of links between concepts),
map diversity (the number of different types of connections
established between concepts: causal, associative, structural,
equivalent, topographical, hierarchical) and the number of
concepts used in the map. The cognitive complexity of the map
was computed using the relative complexity formula presented
in Curs¸eu et al. (2007): GCC = (connectivity∗diversity)/number
of concepts. This index captures groups’ integrative cognitive
complexity (Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993) as it reflects both
the degree of cognitive differentiation (number of concepts and
the diversity of connections among them) as well as integration
(the number of connections among the concepts).
Percentage of women in the group was used as a control variable
to account for the positive effect of gender diversity on GCC
(Curs¸eu et al., 2007; Curs¸eu and Pluut, 2013). Because groups
varied in size and minority influence may vary as a function of
group size, we also accounted for the variance in group size in the
analyses.
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations are
presented in Table 1.
In order to test the hypotheses, we ran an OLS stepwise
regression. In the first step we entered the group size, percentage
of women, minority dissent and social acceptance (Model 1 in
Table 2), in the second step the cross-product term of minority
dissent and social acceptance (Model 2 in Table 2), and in
the third step the cross product of group size and minority
dissent as well as the quadratic term for group size (Model 3
in Table 2). In line with social impact theory, as the number of
majority members increases so does their willingness to resist
minority influence (Latané and Wolf, 1981; Wood et al., 1994).
Therefore, in order to control for the extent to which the
relational hindrances associated with large group size influence
the impact of minority dissent we also entered the cross-product
term between group size and minority dissent in the third step.
Following the procedure described in Aiken et al. (1991),
group size, minority dissent and social acceptance were centered
before entering their cross-product term in the regression, in
order to reduce multicollinearity. The results of the stepwise
regression are presented in Table 2. As predicted, the effect
of minority dissent was positive and significant (β = 0.32,
TABLE 1 | Mean, standard deviation, and correlation.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Group size 5.85 0.97 1
(2) Percentage women 47.91 30.46 −0.06 1
(3) Mean age 23.35 1.10 0.11 −0.28∗∗ 1
(4) Minority dissent 2.75 0.55 −0.02 −0.28∗∗ 0.18 1
(5) Social acceptance 4.10 0.33 −0.07 0.03 −0.07 −0.29∗∗ 1
(6) GCC 3.89 1.63 0.18 0.24∗ −0.00 0.14 0.17
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2 | Results of the OLS regression analyses for group cognitive complexity (N = 92).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
B (SE) 95%BCCI B (SE) 95%BCCI B (SE) 95%BCCI B (SE) 95%BCCI
Main effectsa
Group size (GS) 0.39 (0.16)∗ [0.07; 0.71] 0.43 (0.16)∗∗ [0.12; 0.75] 0.37 (0.16)∗ [0.05; 0.69] 0.31 (0.17)† [−0.03; 0.64]
Percentage of women 0.02 (0.01)∗∗ [0.01; 0.03] 0.02 (0.01)∗∗ [0.01; 0.03] 0.02 (0.01)∗∗ [0.01; 0.03]
Minority dissent (MD) 0.95 (0.31)∗∗ [0.34; 1.57] 0.87 (0.31)∗∗ [0.27; 1.48] 0.81 (0.31)∗∗ [0.21; 1.42] 0.50 (0.31) [−0.11; 1.11]
Social acceptance (SA) 1.34 (0.50)∗∗ [0.34; 2.34] 1.08 (0.50)∗ [0.09; 2.08] 1.13 (0.51)∗ [0.12; 2.14] 0.99 (0.52)† [−0.04; 2.03]
Interaction effects
MD × SA 1.92 (0.82)∗ [0.29; 3.55] 2.16 (0.82)∗ [0.53; 3.80] 1.98 (0.86)∗ [0.27; 3.68]
MD × GS 0.15 (0.40) [−0.65; 0.95]
Group size squared −0.23 (0.11)∗ [−0.44; −0.02] −0.25 (0.11)∗ [−0.46; −0.03]
Conditional effects MD
Low SA 0.25 (0.43) [−0.60; 1.10] −0.15 (0.44) [−1.03; 0.74]
Average SA 0.87 (0.30)∗∗ [0.27; 1.48] 0.50 (31) [−0.11; 1.11]
High SA 1.50 (0.38)∗∗ [0.74; 2.26] 1.14 (0.38)∗∗ [0.37; 1.90]
Rsq 0.21 0.26 0.30 0.20
F change 5.81∗∗ 5.46∗ 2.40† 4.21∗∗
a †p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01, unstandardized regression coefficients are presented in the table, SE, standard error, BCCI, bias corrected confidence intervals.
p = 0.003), therefore the first hypothesis is supported. Moreover,
the addition of the cross-product term added significantly to
the predictive power of the model F(1,86) = 5.39 (p = 0.02),
and the effect was significant (β = 0.22, p = 0.02). Therefore,
we can conclude that Hypothesis 2 was supported too. We
used the “pick-a-point” procedure described in Hayes and
Matthes (2009) to estimate the conditional effect of minority
dissent on GCC (see Table 2 for the results). This method
allowed us to estimate the effect of minority dissent (our
focal predictor) at low (one standard deviation below the
mean), average (sample mean) and high (one standard deviation
above the mean) representative values of social acceptance (our
moderator variable). We have used the SPSS macro described
in Hayes and Matthes (2009) to compute the conditional
effects of minority dissent on GCC. The conditional effects of
minority dissent on GCC depending on social acceptance show
that at low levels of social acceptance the effect of minority
dissent on GCC was not significant, while at average and
high levels of social acceptance the effect of minority dissent
on GCC was positive and significant. Figure 1 depicts the
interaction effect of minority dissent and social acceptance on
GCC.
The percentage of women had a positive association with GCC
(β = 0.33, p = 0.001), meaning that groups with more women
developed a more complex collective cognition than groups with
fewer women. This outcome is in line with the results presented
in Woolley et al. (2010), showing that the percentage of women in
groups is a positive predictor of collective intelligence. Moreover,
FIGURE 1 | The interaction effect of minority dissent and social acceptance on group cognitive complexity (GCC). MD, minority dissent; SA, social
acceptance.
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FIGURE 2 | The non-linear association between group size and GCC.
group size had a positive association with GCC (β = 0.22,
p = 0.02), meaning that larger groups developed more complex
representations than small groups. However, the quadratic term
of group size had a significant negative association with GCC
(β = −0.22, p = 0.025), that next to the significant positive
effect of group size support the non-linear association between
group size and GCC. We therefore conclude that Hypothesis 3
is supported. The non-linear association between group size and
GCC is depicted in Figure 2.
The interaction effect of group size and minority dissent
was not significant (β = 0.04, ns), therefore in our sample, the
influence of minority dissent on GCC is not moderated by group
size. However, in the whole sample, six groups were composed
of four members or less, and because our measure of minority
dissent referred to one or two members as a minority, we repeated
our analyses excluding these six groups from the sample and the
results did not change. Following one of reviewer’s comments, in
order to further check the robustness of our results we ran the
OLS analyses without the control variables (gender diversity and
the interaction term between group size and minority dissent).
The results are presented in Model 4 (Table 2). The interaction
effect between MD and SA is significant and the quadratic effect
of group size also remained significant, therefore we conclude
that our results concerning group size and minority dissent are
robust.
DISCUSSION
Our study provides further evidence for the positive association
between minority dissent and knowledge elaboration in groups.
Moreover, our study shows that social acceptance has a
positive association with GCC, and, as such, we provide
empirical evidence for the fact that complex emergent group
cognition needs social integration. As argued by Gruenfeld
and Hollingshead (1993) GCC requires both differentiation
and integration. In order to develop cognitively complex
representations, groups need to explore a wide variety of facts
and task-related knowledge (differentiation) and to be able to
establish numerous links among these constructs included in the
representations (integration). Minority dissent is most certainly
a driving force for differentiation, as divergent views expressed
by minorities trigger cognitive conflict and stimulate divergent
thinking (Nemeth, 1985, 1986; Nemeth et al., 2001). Social
acceptance eventually stimulates the knowledge integration and
thus increase the integrative potential of the group. These results
are aligned with the positive indirect effects of social network
differentiation (number of cliques or network fragmentation)
and integration (network density) on GCC (Curs¸eu et al.,
2012a). Future research could explore other factors that may
stimulate knowledge differentiation and integration in groups as
antecedents for GCC.
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Group size has a non-linear association with GCC, with an
inflection point at group sizes of five or six members. In other
words, the positive association between group size and GCC
reaches a plateau for group sizes of five or six members and
then it turns negative. This finding has important implications
for deciding on the optimal group size in collaborative learning
settings in order to balance the cognitive benefits of having more
resources with the detriments of social loafing and coordination
costs. Further research could use the antecedents-benefit-costs
framework (Busse et al., 2016) to further explore the two
mechanisms (cognitive and socio-relational) that could explain
the non-linear association between group size and GCC.
An emergent result refers to the positive effect of the
percentage of women in groups on GCC. This result is
similar to empirical evidence from the collective intelligence
research (Woolley et al., 2010), showing that the percentage of
women is positively associated to group intelligence (groups’
capacity of effectively solving a variety of cognitive tasks). It
is argued that due to their higher social sensitivity, women
create and preserve good interpersonal relations in groups and
ultimately increase collective performance (Woolley et al., 2010).
Moreover, the percentage of women is positively associated to the
collective emotional intelligence of groups (Curs¸eu et al., 2015)
and ultimately to group performance. Therefore, the plausible
mechanism that explains the positive association between the
percentage of women in groups and GCC is teamwork quality.
Future research could further explore this claim.
Because teamwork skills are essential for employability in
modern organizations (Chen et al., 2004) universities adapted
their education programs to include group work (Riebe et al.,
2010) in which students can exercise and develop their teamwork
skills. Acquiring teamwork skills, however, is not a trivial
endeavor as group work in higher education is often marked
by conflict and tensions (Kamau and Spong, 2015). Although
beneficial in many respects, minority dissent can have negative
consequences and dealing with these consequences is a key
component of teamwork skills. As our results show, building a
group climate that is accepting toward individual contributions
is one path that can be followed to deal with the negative
consequences of minority dissent. In practical terms, our study
shows the necessity of having both minority dissent as well as a
socially accepting group climate.
How to Generate Dissent and Social
Acceptance in Groups?
As illustrated by our results, if groups develop a socially accepting
climate, the cognitive benefits of dissent can be enhanced. Social
acceptance of dissent can be induced through group norms or
process interventions. Groups can be trained to use a number
of “ground rules” while working together; ground rules that
help create an accepting climate that also allows for dissent.
The benefits of normative frameworks in the emergence of
group cognition has previously been documented (Curs¸eu and
Schruijer, 2012).
Another way of stimulating constructive cognitive conflict in
groups and enhance the level of participation in collaborative
discourse is the use of argumentation-vee-diagrams (Nussbaum,
2008; Nussbaum and Edwards, 2011). The graphic technique
of argument-counterargument integration, allows students to
follow a structured dialogue and actively engage in dissent.
The argument-counterargument integration using the graphical
support of diagrams (Nussbaum and Schraw, 2007) will ensure
both differentiation (exploration of various aspects in a cognitive
schema) as well as integration (in depth consideration of counter-
arguments during the debate through refutation, synthesis and
weighing) that are essential for the emergence of cognitively
complex collective representations.
Decision techniques as the “devil’s advocacy” could also be
used to create minority dissent, although research to date shows
that natural dissent is more effective than contrived dissent in
generating high quality decisions (Nemeth et al., 2001; Schulz-
Hardt et al., 2002). Such a technique involves appointing a typical
“devil’s advocate” role within the group and the person holding
that role will eventually criticize the preferences shared by the
majority. Role rotation can be used in order to reduce the social
rejection and the negative consequences of repeatedly playing
this role and in this way group members could develop a more
accurate understanding of the intricacies of disagreeing with the
group and ultimately be more accepting when this behavior is
enacted by someone else.
Finally, elements of diversity awareness training could be
adopted to create short interventions aimed at increasing
awareness of the benefits of minority dissent. Diversity awareness
training was originally introduced to alleviate some of the
negative consequences of group diversity, mostly rooted in social
categorization processes (Robertson et al., 2001). As minority
dissent is actually a form of cognitively enacted diversity (a
minority expresses opinions that contradict the status quo in
the group), elements of diversity awareness training could help
group members understand their natural tendency of distancing
themselves from a dissenter and to grow more accepting of
dissent in their group’s midst.
Limitations
Next to its contributions this study has several limitations.
First, none of the independent variables considered here were
directly manipulated and the study is cross-sectional. Therefore,
no causal claims can be inferred. Second, as the study is cross-
sectional and the data regarding the independent variables
were collected from the same source, common method bias
is a concern (Podsakoff et al., 2011). However, in order to
mitigate this concern, GCC was evaluated by an independent
rater. Therefore, the dependent variable evaluation comes from
a different source. Moreover, as illustrated by Evans (1985),
common method bias is less of a concern for studies testing
interactions as the interaction effect estimated in the linear
regression is not likely to be an artifact of common method
bias (Siemsen et al., 2010). Third, the instructions used in
the cognitive mapping exercise (group members had to reach
consensus on the cognitive map structure) could have enforced
artificial consensus. In different contexts, the emergent group
level cognitive structures could actually be more volatile and
difficult to capture.
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